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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
by
Henry D. Akin*

T

HE pitched battle in the workmen's compensation field between literal
application and liberal construction is still being waged in Texas
courts. In the landmark case of Mingus v. Wadley' the Texas Supreme
Court, speaking through Chief Justice Cureton, established the rationale
for the literal view:
This suit arises out of a workmen's compensation proceeding, and it is
therefore in derogation of the common law. The rights to be enforced, and
all the remedies provided therefor, are purely statutory, as distinguished from
the common law rights and remedies....
The general rule is that where the cause of action and remedy for its enforcement are derived not from the common law but from the statute, the
statutory provisions are mandatory and exclusive, and must be complied with
in all respects or the action is not maintainable.!
Compare the above language with the recent use of the timeworn clich6:
"The remedial statutes in the Workmen's Compensation Law should be
liberally construed with the view to accomplish its purpose and to promote
justice.... They are given a broad and liberal construction by the courts in
order that the humane purpose of their enactment may be realized." ' The
battle line is sharply drawn in other cases.4 It appears from recent decisions
that the courts sometimes apply the provisions of the Texas Workmen's
Compensation Act literally, but more often liberally construe its provisions, dependent to a certain extent on the merits of the case and the viewpoint of the examiner.
I. SCOPE OF THE ACT

ExtraterritorialProvision. During the past year the appellate courts had
occasion to re-examine the extraterritorial provisions of the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act.' Reaffirmed was the well-established rule that the
true test of coverage is whether the employee occupied the "status of a
Texas employee;" that is, whether it was contemplated that he would work
for the subscriber in Texas (the judicial standard) rather than whether he
was hired in Texas (as set out by the legislature). For example, where a
* A.B., Southwestern University; LL.B., University of Texas. Adjunct Professor of Law,
Southern Methodist University; Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Messrs. W. Richard Jones and Marcus L. Thompson in the preparation of this
Article.
1115 Tex. 551, 285 S.W. 1084 (1926).
21d. at 557, 285 S.W. at 1087.

'Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Thomas, 415 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). See also
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 415 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), where the court stated,
"The Texas Workmen's Compensation Act must be given a liberal construction to carry out its
evident
purpose."
4
Compare, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 410 S.W.2d 27, 34-35 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966) error ref. n.r.e. (dissenting opinion) with King v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 416
S.W.2d 533, 538 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
5
TEx. REV. Cxv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 19 (1967).
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claimant was hired in Texas by a Texas employer but was injured in an
automobile accident in England and had not worked in Texas prior to
going overseas, it was held that the claimant might have the status of a
Texas employee under the extraterritorial provisions of the Act if his employment contract encompassed work in Texas at some subsequent date.'
The judgment of the trial court was reversed and remanded in order to
permit claimant to develop this issue in view of the recent decision of the
Texas Supreme Court in Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Dossey.7
That case held that an employee's status is fixed by his employment to work
in Texas as well as in another state and the employee continues to occupy
this status even though he first works in the other state.
Policy Limitation. A court of civil appeals considered the scope of a policy of workmen's compensation and employers' liability insurance which
provided that the policy applied "only to injury or death sustained in the
United States of America, its territories or possessions, or Canada."' An
employee was killed when the aircraft in which he was riding on company
business between two points in Texas crashed into the Gulf of Mexico,
twenty-one miles from the Texas coast. It was held that this accident was
not within the scope of the coverage since "The high sea does not form
part of the territory of any nation. No nation can have over it any right
of ownership, sovereignty or jurisdiction." '
Seamen. Claimant received an injury while working as a seaman aboard
a shrimp boat. He submitted a claim under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act" and was awarded compensation. He then
sued his employer based on unseaworthiness of the boat. The court of civil
appeals, reversing the summary judgment granted the employer, reasoned
that, while the Act apparently bars an employee from suing his employer,
the United States Supreme Court has held to the contrary where the cause
of action is based on the unseaworthiness of a vessel owned by the employer."
Non-Payment of Premium. The fact that the employer has failed to pay
the premium on the workmen's compensation policy does not prevent the
employer from being a subscriber and does not prevent the employees from
being within the scope of the Act. Even though the employer failed to report her son as an employee on the payroll turned in to the insurer, so that
no premium had been paid on him, a court of civil appeals held that the
injured employee was covered by the policy since "protection is not lost
because his employer failed to pay the proper premium to the insurance
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Spritzman, 410 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
(Tex. 1966), discussed in Akin, Workinen's Compensation, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 75, 76 (1967).
8 Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Samuels, 407 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref.n.r.c.
7402 S.W.2d 153

IId. at 841.

1033 U.S.C. §§ 901-950,

44 Stat. 1424 (1927).

" Terry v. Southeast Packing Co., 416 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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company."" It has also been held immaterial, so far as an injured employee
is concerned, whether the premiums were paid or the manner in which
they were paid."
II.

EXTENT OF COVERAGE

Donestic Servants. The Workmen's Compensation Act specifically states
that its provisions shall not apply to personal injuries sustained by domestic
servants.' 4 In Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. King"s the
claimant was hired to work as a general "handy woman" for a familyowned corporation and her compensation was three times the rate for domestic servants in the area. In addition to cleaning and maintaining the
corporate offices, she was expected to do almost anything necessary in the

furtherance of the business of the corporation. This sometimes included
cleaning, cooking and baby-sitting in the homes of the corporate officers.

The court of civil appeals upheld an award to claimant for injuries sustained while performing domestic work in an officer's home. The Texas
Supreme Court reversed over a strong dissent.'" The court observed that
Mrs. King was engaged to work both as a domestic servant and as an employee of the automobile agency and was injured while working as a domestic servant, not while working under that part of her employment
contract providing that she work for the agency. The court further stated
that she was not within the statutory definition of "employee"' 7 at the time
of the injury since the domestic work was not in the usual course of the
business of the agency and she had not been temporarily directed or instructed to perform the work by her employer.
Independent Contractor. In addition to the domestic servants exclusion,
the courts examined and reiterated the rule that an independent contractor
or an employee of an independent contractor is not covered by workmen's
compensation insurance taken out by the person engaging the services of
the independent contractor.' 8 Where a truck driver for a delivery service
was injured while making a contracted delivery, the truck driver remained
in the regular employment of the delivery service and was not a loaned employee of the company whose freight he was delivering. His regular employer was held liable for workmen's compensation benefits, even though
he was instructed to do whatever the freight company desired him to do.
A similar rationale was used where the general contractor, an electrician,
had subcontracted welding work to a subcontractor who, finding it physically impossible to complete the work, had turned it over to claimant.
The court held that the claimant was an independent contractor or an em"Coal

Operators Cas. Co. v. Richardson, 414 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)

error ref.

n.r.e.
''Le Jeune v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 410 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
'"TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 2 (1967).
"11 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 99 (1967).

"Id. at 103.
7
' TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 2 (1967).
"Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 410 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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ployee of an independent contractor and was not an employee of the general contractor for workmen's compensation purposes. '
Course of Employment. While the Act does not specifically so provide,
it is well established that for an injury to fall within the scope of the
Workmen's Compensation Act it must have been sustained in the course of
employment as defined by the Act.' Whether or not the injury in question was so sustained was contested in numerous cases during the past year.
In one, decedent and a fellow employee were employed by a liquor store.
They were required to work together and were closing the store; decedent
had a daily report in his hand to be mailed to his employer. The fellow
employee's insane cousin, intending to kill only the fellow employee, shot
and killed both men. In spite of the provision of the Act that "injuries sustained in the course of employment" shall not include "an injury caused
by an act of a third person intended to injure the employee because of
reasons personal to him and not directed against him as an employee, or
because of his employment,"'" the court held these facts sufficient to support the finding that decedent was in the course of his employment at the
time he was killed. 2
In another case involving course of employment, claimant worked on a
day basis for his mother who operated a logging business. On a Sunday evening he drove a truck, owned by his mother and used in her business, to
view logs. In considering whether claimant was insured while returning by
a different but direct route, the jury found that at the time of his injury
the claimant was his mother's employee and was in the course of his employment. The judgment in favor of claimant was affirmed.'
An unusual fact situation was presented where a truck driver fell off a
bridge while hunting for a billfold belonging to one of the occupants of a
wrecked automobile which blocked the highway. This was held to present
a prima facie case of injury while in the course of the truck driver's employment.' Although he was not actually doing what was specifically prescribed to him, in view of the emergency he was doing what he thought
was necessary for the purpose of advancing the work in which he was engaged for his employer. Although the court found no Texas case close in
point on the facts, it cited and distinguished Safety Casualty Co. v.
Wright.' That case held that a pipeline inspector who had walked down a
pipeline and was returning by bus was not in the course of his employment
when injured while helping the bus driver change a tire. The instant case
was distinguished from Wright because an emergency was herein involved.
In another unusual case,2 a hotel desk clerk was injured in two assaults,
"9Goodnight v. Zurich Ins. Co., 416 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
2°TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, S 1 (1967)
(definition of "injury sustained in course
of employment").
1 Id.
" Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hampton, 414 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
"Coal Operators Cas. Co. v. Richardson, 414 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref.
n.r.e.
"Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Thomas, 415 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
"5138 Tex. 492, 160 S.W.2d 238 (1942).
2'Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 415 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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some thirty or forty minutes apart, by a fellow desk clerk following a
quarrel over repeated telephone calls requesting the assailant to report to
work. Since the assaults grew out of the work being done for the employer
and the testimony showed that the claimant was not the aggressor, claimant
was held to be in the course of his employment.
A change of pace is noted where an employee, after leaving the oil field
where he had repaired his employer's equipment, was killed in a noon-hour
collision on a road which was not on the direct route to his employer's shop
but was on a direct route to the home of a friend with whom he had agreed
to have lunch. 7 It was held that there was no evidence of a probative
value that he was in the course of his employment at the time of his death.
III.

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of the Industrial Accident Board. In his concurring opinion
in Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Holt 8 Chief Justice Calvert of the
Texas Supreme Court stated that the Industrial Accident Board "has jurisdiction of every claim filed seeking benefits under the Texas Workmen's
Compensation Act. It has jurisdiction to grant the claim, in whole or in
part, and to deny it. If it does not make an award of benefits, it should
deny the claim."2 In the instant case, the Board had dismissed the claim
for want of jurisdiction. The claim had been pending for more than eight
years, and the Board noted that "the courts have held that this Board is
without jurisdiction to act on a claim after a period of 401 weeks following
the date of the injury." The supreme court held that this order of the
Board was final and appealable. Chief Justice Calvert's opinion should put
the matter to rest by its forthright statement that "there should be no
occasion for continuing the confusion" created by the "practice of refusing
to act on claims for compensation for want of jurisdiction or of dismissing
them for that reason."' Surely the Board will take the hint and be guided
accordingly hereafter.
Jurisdiction of Courts. In a case of first impression," claimant filed a
timely notice of unwillingness to abide by the final award of the Industrial
Accident Board, which had denied his claim for compensation, and filed
suit against just one insurance company. He then named another insurance
company as co-defendant in his second amended original petition which
was filed more than four months later. It was held that the court lacked
jurisdiction over the second insurance company because suit was not filed
against it within twenty days following the notice of unwillingness to abide
by the award as required by the general statute of limitations.' The filing
of the suit against one insurance company did not toll the statute as to the
'Texas
n.r.e.

Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Brown, 415 S.W.2d 260

(Tex. Civ. App. 1967)

error ref.

28410 S.W.2d

633 (Tex. 1967).
"Id. at 637.
30 Id.
"'Richards v. Consolidated Underwriters, 411 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)
12 Tsx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (1967).

error ref.
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other insurance company and no fraud or other equitable ground was al-

leged which would have prevented the statute from running.
In another case, instead of filing notice with the Industrial Accident
Board of unwillingness to abide by a final award within twenty days after

the award," the claimant filed suit in the district court six days after the
award. Eleven days after the Board's award, the Board received notice from
the district clerk of the filing of the suit. The insurance company contended that the trial court had no jurisdiction of the attempted appeal
from the award since proper notice had not been given to the Board. The
claimant asserted that the letter from the district clerk was substantial if
not strict compliance with' the statute and relied upon the well-established
rule that the workmen's compensation law should be liberally construed
in favor of the claimant. The court of civil appeals, reversing its original
opinion, on motion for rehearing upheld claimant's contention."4 This case is
typical of the numerous recent cases which have liberally construed the
Act.
Angelina Casualty Co. v. Bennett" held that a judgment approving a
compromise settlement which covered future medical expenses was not
within the power conferred on a court in workmen's compensation cases.
The judgment was binding upon both parties. It could be set aside only
in an independent proceeding alleging fraud or other equitable grounds for
rescission or cancellation, and not by withdrawing consent before the
judgment is reduced to writing. But, the court of civil appeals reasoned
that the approval of a compromise settlement agreement does not constitute
an appealable award or an appealable judgment. Therefore, the court had
no jurisdiction of an appeal from the approved agreement, just as the trial
court would have no jurisdiction over an appeal from a compromise settlement approved by the Industrial Accident Board.
Variance in Nature of Claim. The rule of Booth v. Texas Employers'
Insurance Ass'nz6 has been followed in two cases which overruled pleas to
the jurisdiction based upon a variance between the claim filed before the
Industrial Accident Board and the claim asserted in court. The Booth rule
states that it is the identity of the incident or occurrence that controls when
there is a claim of variance, and the claim may be enlarged in court to
include all injuries resulting from the accident.
In one case, claimant filed a claim for occupational disease before the
Board, alleging that the first distinct manifestation of the disease occurred
on March 5, 1963.' The occupational disease and the cause thereof were
described as an injury or irritation of lung tissues and bronchi caused by
breathing gas fumes from furnaces in the plant. In court he alleged he
sustained an accidental personal injury from inhaling noxious gas and
Id.
"4Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 410 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
3
" Angelina Cas. Co. v. Bennett, 415 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
36 132 Tex. 237, 123 S.W.2d 322 (1938).
"TConsolidated Underwriters v. Wright, 408 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref.
33

mtr.e.
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fumes on both March 5, 1963, and on July 29, 1963. In another case, the
claim before the Board was for a heart attack while the pleading in court
described the injury as damage to head, neck, shoulder and back.3" In both
cases the claims were sustained using the Booth rationale.

Good Cause. The courts followed prior holdings that issues as to good
cause for not filing a claim for compensation within six months from the
date of the injury were raised by evidence: that the insurer's adjuster had
advised claimant that he would take care of everything;"9 that claimant,
who could not read or write, believed his supervisors had filed the necessary
papers; ' that claimant thought his injuries were not serious; ' and, that
claimant was mentally or physically incapacitated to file 42a claim for compensation for a period of fifteen months after his injury.
In another case involving good cause, 3 insurer's verified answer stated
that plaintiff had not given timely notice of injury to his employer. The
answer did not negate the possibility that the employer had received notice
from some other source, such as from the insurer. On the day of trial,
insurer filed an amended answer which negated all possibility of notice being received by the employer. The jury found that notice had not been
given, but could not resolve the issue inquiring if plaintiff had good cause
for failing to give notice. The trial court declared a mistrial. Plaintiff
sought mandamus from the court of civil appeals to compel the trial court
to disregard the issue of good cause and to enter judgment for plaintiff,
contending that insurer's amended answer was insufficient to raise the issue
of good cause. Plaintiff asserted that the amended answer violated the
rules" which require a verified denial of notice to be filed seven days before
trial, and therefore, the denial was insufficient to raise the issue. In denying
mandamus the court relied on the principle that an appellate court will
not review by mandamus the action of a trial court in granting a new trial
while the trial court still has jurisdiction of the cause.
IV.

PROCEDURE

Venue. Without discussing the matter, the court of civil appeals seemed
to assume that proving a prima facie cause of action was a necessary element in establishing venue in a plea of privilege suit where claimant was
seeking to recover compensation under the Texas law for an injury received outside of Texas."
Evidence.

During the preceding year numerous cases have concerned evi-

38Travelers Ins. Co. v. Strech, 416 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
39 Id.
"'Continental Cas. Co. v. Abercrombie, 413 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref.
n.r.e.
41 King v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 416 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref.
.r.e.; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Brown, 408 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref.
n.r.e.
"'Maryland Cas. Co. v. Spritzman, 410 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
"Allen v. Long, 408 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error dismissed.
44TEX. R. Civ. P. 93(n); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307(b) (1967).
"'Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Thomas, 415 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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dentiary matters. The courts proved to be fairly liberal in admitting evidence in workmen's compensation cases.
Admissibility. Among the many cases involving admissibility" those
involving hospital records were the most significant. Where claimant testified that before his injury he had never worn a back brace and had never
been hit in the back with an axe, a doctor's report contained in hospital
records was admitted to show that such injury had occurred and that the
patient had worn a lumbo-sacral back brace.4 This evidence was admitted
in spite of the fact that the doctor could not be sure that it was a copy of
his consultation report and could not find out who had written his name
on the report.
Suficiency. In addition to cases involving admissibility, a large number of decisions turned on the question of whether the evidence was sufficient to support a causal connection between the injury and disability.'
In related cases the Texas appellate courts reviewed numerous decisions on
the question of. the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the extent of the
"In the following situations evidence was held to be admissible: Proof of fact and beneficial
results of surgery voluntarily assumed by employee subsequent to an award of the Board and prior
to trial, Houston Fire & Cas. Co. v. Dieter, 409 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. 1966); exhibition of claimant's wife's leg and foot when limited to the lump sum issue (illustrating one advantage of conceding lump sum), Angelina Cas. Co. v. Russell, 410 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error
ref. n.r.e.; notation of diagnosis of treating physician on hospital records, Weicher v. Insurance
Co. of N. America, 415 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error granted; opinion of a doctor
who perhaps took into consideration information related to him by the claimant's wife who accompanied the claimant when the doctor took claimant's case history from him (and evidently
from claimant's wife too), Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Steadman, 415 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.; hearsay statements of claimant's doctor to show compliance with the
doctor's instructions, Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ferguson, 417 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
It was held that the following evidence was properly excluded: Testimony of a doctor of insurer's choice in reference to claimant's neck and shoulder injuries, since claimant's attorney had
agreed that the doctor could examine what was going to be exhibited and claimant exhibited only
his arm, Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Potter, 411 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error
ref. n.r.e.; and, a prior petition for total and permanent disability from a hernia where the subsequent case involved a back injury, Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ferguson, 417 S.W.2d
376 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e. The appellate court in the latter case apparently assumed the role of a medical expert in holding that a prior hernia would have no bearing on the
claimed low back disability.
"'Allstate Ins. Co. v. Davis, 415 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
" The evidence was held sufficient to support a causal connection between the injury and disability under the following circumstances: Where the medical expert testified he thought that the
coronary occlusion resulted from heavy exertion, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Scruggs, 413 S.W.2d
416 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); where in response to a hypothetical question, the doctor testified that
claimant's fall contributed to his mental disorder, Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Steadman, 415
S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.; and, where all the evidence was sufficient to
support the jury's finding that a prior and subsequent injury did not contribute to claimant's incapacity, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Munos, 415 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
The evidence was held insufficient to support a causal connection between the injury and the
disability under the following circumstances: Where a heavy bundle of clothes fell towards the
deceased and caused her body to be jerked violently in the area of her head and neck in a whiplash fashion, causing a cervical sprain, and she later died from a malignant brain tumor, since the
medical evidence did no more than express a medical possibility that the injury could have caused
aggravation or excitement of the pre-existing brain tumor, Insurance Co. of N. America v. Myers,
411 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. 1966); where the evidence showed no connection between claimant's
lumbar sacral sprain and her third degree syphilis, American Sur. Co. v. Semmons, 413 S.W.2d
732 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.; where there was no medical evidence of causal connection between claimant's heat exhaustion and her swollen arm and general debility, Weicher v.
Insurance Co. of N. America, 415 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error granted; and, where
the only evidence of total disability was that claimant did not return to work for four weeks
following his injury, at which time he continued to suffer pain in his back, Sonnier v. Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 417 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).

1968]

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

injury." Because of their volume, these cases can be treated only cursorily
here.
The courts have held fast to the rule that an injury must extend to and
effect some part of the body other than a specific member in order to
enlarge a specific injury into a general injury. The evidence was held
sufficient to enlarge a specific injury into a general injury where the claimant caught three fingers of her right hand in a grinder while pushing pecans toward it and the injury to her three fingers extended to and affected
her shoulder or neck, thereby causing incapacity.' But, the evidence was
held insufficient to enlarge a specific partial incapacity into total permanent incapacity where claimant fell from a truck and injured his right
4' In the following situations the evidence was held to be sufficient to support judgments for
the following extents of disability: Total and permanent disability where five lay witnesses and
two medical witnesses testified, Consolidated Underwriters v. Wright, 408 S.W.2d 140 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.; three hundred weeks of total disability followed by partial
disability where the only three witnesses were claimant, his wife, and his brother, Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co. v. Brewer, 411 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.; total and permanent
disability supported by claimant's own testimony alone, Travelers Ins. Co. v. White, 413 S.W.2d
157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.; total and permanent disability where the only testimony was by the claimant and three lay witnesses with no expert witnesses to prove extent of
the injury, Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. Ferguson, 417 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)
error ref. n.r.e.; two weeks total disability and no partial disability where a doctor testified that
at the time claimant was discharged from the hospital, after three days stay in traction to reduce
muscle spasm, claimant was markedly improved and the doctor believed that with an additional
week of rest, claimant would be all right, Aguirre v. Pan Am. Ins. Co., 417 S.W.2d 900 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1967); fifteen weeks disability where, in spite of a successful operation for an admitted hernia, the claimant sued only for a back injury and supporting evidence was given by
the claimant's brother and a medical opinion was based on claimant's statement to the medical
expert, Williams v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 414 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); total and
permanent disability where claimant secured a job as a sales trainee making three times as much
as he was making at the time of his injury but his back and neck prevented his securing eiployment in fields in which he had experience, Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Pittsford, 411 S.W.2d
755 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.; total and permanent disability where claimant resumed hard labor for the same employer and earned more money than he earned before injury,
since he worked only because he had no other way to eat and feed his family, Consolidated Underwriters v. Whittaker, 413 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.; total and permanent disability where claimant was pulling on a heavy material to make blue jeans notch in the
crotch and had a pop in her wrist and pain in her arm, shoulder and neck, Travelers Ins. Cx v.
Heim, 413 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); total and permanent disability caused by heat
exhaustion where the employee was engaged in the performance of duties that subjected him to
a greater hazard of heat exhaustion than ordinarily applied to the general public, Commercial
Standard Ins. Co. v. Allred, 413 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. 1967); total and permanent disability where
being struck in the face by a grinder caused a mental disorder, according to the opinion of a
psychiatrist and the original treating doctor, Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Steadman, 415
S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.; total and permanent disability where claimant
was making more as a preacher after the injury than he was previously making as a stock clerk
(evidently this Baptist Preacher had a tither in his tank), Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Curlee, 416
S.W.2d 890 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
In the following cases appellate courts held that the judgment was not sufficiently supported:
Where the evidence, including the doctor's testimony, did no more than express medical possibility that the injury caused aggravation or excitement of a pre-existing brain tumor, Insurance
Co. of N. America v. Myers, 411 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. 1966); where testimony was to the effect
that third degree syphilis could have been or possibly was aggravated by alleged injuries, American
Sur. Co. v. Semmons, 413 S.W.21d 732 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.; where there was
no evidence that cancer of the lung was caused by being struck in the abdomen and chest by a
heavy steel beam as there was no medical testimony to establish a connection between the blow
and the cancer, Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Gallegos, 415 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967);
and, where there was no evidence that claimant was disabled by heat exhausion or that claimant
was exposed to a greater hazard by reason of employment than the general public, in which case
an instructed verdict was held to be proper, Weicher v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 415 S.W.2d
220 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error granted.
so United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Hernandez, 410 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error
ref. n.r.e.
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arm, resulting in tenderness where the deltoid muscle attaches to the humerus and radiating pain through his shoulder. 1 The evidence was also
insufficient where burns to claimant's fingers and hand did not cause extension of injury to some part of the body other than the specific members."
Wage Rate. One court held that the evidence was sufficient to fix
claimant's average weekly wages under subsection 2 of the definition of
"Average Weekly Wages"" where the claimant was being paid $25.81 per
week but had not worked 210 days during the year immediately preceding
his injury. Another employee of the same class had worked 210 days of
the preceding year in the same or similar employment in the same or in a
neighboring place and had earned $65.00 per week during the days he was
employed." Moreover, where claimant's wife testified that the work of a
pipe fitter was different from that of a millwright, the evidence was held
sufficient to support an award basing claimant's average weekly wage
upon the wages of another pipe fitter who had worked 210 days as a pipe
fitter during the preceding year. Other cases, however, were reversed because the wage rate was not supported by the evidence."
V.

THE JURY

linproper Information and Argument to Jury.

An insurer claimed it was

reversible error for the claimant's attorney to read to the jury that portion
of his pleading regarding maximum compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act. The court held that, while it is better practice not to
read to the jury those portions of the pleadings with which the jury is not
concerned, such reading does not constitute reversible error in the absence
of a showing of prejudice. The court failed to find a reading of such pleadings resulted in such prejudice as to warrant a reversal. s" During the past
year the courts adhered to the rule that, before an improper argument will
constitute reversible error, it must appear that the argument was reasonably
"Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dooley, 410 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
"Casualty Reciprocal Exch. v. Rodriguez, 415 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
"aTEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, S I (1967).
54

Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Jordan, 410 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
" In one case the court of civil appeals held that the trial court had erred in rendering judgment on the theory of another's employment and earning capacity under the provisions of subsection 2 of the Wage Rate Statute, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (1967), where
the cab driver claimant had worked only 156 days during the year immediately preceding lis
injury and had earned $597.58, and his average earnings during the six or seven years that he had
previously worked for this company were approximately $736.00. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liptrap,
413 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e. While the evidence showed that there
were other employees who had worked at least 210 days during the year immediately preceding
claimant's injury, these employees were cab drivers paid on a commission basis. Their earnings
varied from $7.00 to $15.00 per day and none of them had received the same amount per day or
per week as claimant had been paid. Thus, it was not practical to compute claimant's average
weekly wages on the basis of the earnings of the other drivers.
The court of civil appeals in Sonnier v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 417 S.W.2d 433 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1967), affirmed the trial court's directed verdict for the insurance carrier. The claimant
was seeking compensation for partial incapacity but was unable to offer any evidence from which
the jury could have found a wage rate. The court stressed that, while there is a statutory minimum wage rate in the case of total incapacity (TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 10),
no such provision is applicable for partial incapacity.
"'Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ferguson, 417 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)
error ref.

ir.e.
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calculated to and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment. s"
Court's Charge. In Standard Insurance Co. v. Allred s" the Texas Supreme
Court held that a special issue which asked, "Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Leroy Allred sustained an injury to his body
as a result of a heat exhaustion on or about April 9, 1963?" did not assume that a heat exhaustion had occurred and was not a comment on the
weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err in submitting such an
issue to the jury.
One trial court's definition of "injury" was held prejudicial to the defendant insurer since it allowed the jury to consider the possible effect of
the injury on all of claimant's pre-existing bodily conditions."s The trial
court failed to limit the jury's consideration of possible aggravation to
those pre-existing conditions for which expert evidence could show a reasonably probable causal connection.
Another trial court's definition of "injury" was held prejudicial to a
claimant for being too exclusive."0 The definition included a reference to
possible aggravation of a pre-existing disease but failed to also encompass
the possibility of aggravation of a pre-existing natural cause of bodily
infirmity or condition. In another case there was no proper medical evidence to connect plaintiff's lung cancer to his injury and it was held reversible error for the trial court to refuse to submit to the jury an issue as
to whether lung cancer was the sole cause of claimant's incapacity. 1
Where plaintiff based his claim solely on a general injury and the insurer
pleaded only a general denial, insurer was not allowed to submit a defensive
special issue inquiring whether plaintiff's disability was limited to the loss
of use of his right arm."
"7Coal Operators Cas. Co. v. Richardson, 414 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error 'ef.
n.r.e. (not reversible error where claimant's attorney argued outside the record that claimant was
going his usual way home, made a direct reply to the argument of insurer's counsel that claimant
was a liar, guilty of criminal acts and not worthy of belief, and gave unsworn testimony that insurer had subpoenaed records and had not used them, since trial court, on insurer's objection,
instructed jury to disregard these arguments); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Heim, 413 S.W.2d 796
(Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (not reversible error where counsel for claimant referred to insurer as
being like an octopus which squirts when it gets into trouble since the argument could not
have persuaded any juror of ordinary intelligence); Wallace v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 413
S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e. (held not reversible error where insurer's
counsel referred to four jurors by name, called attention to claimant's mimeographed petition
which showed that claimant's attorney had so much workmen's compensation business that he
had to have his petitions mimeographed, inquired why claimant did not bring in three other
doctors who had examined claimant, and argued that he would not ask the jury to believe him
if he did not believe his case to be true and sincere, since these improper arguments were not of
the incurable type, and no objection had been made); Consolidated Underwriters v. Whittaker,
413 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e. (not reversible error where court instructed jury not to consider argument of plaintiff's counsel that a medical witness for insurer
had admitted that he missed the diagnosis in a previous trial of another case that week); Travelers
Ins. Co. v. White, 413 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e. (not reversible error
when argument indicated that a verdict in claimant's favor would entitle him to future medical
benefits); Angelina Cas. Co. v. Russell, 410 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
(improper argument referring to claimant's wife's unrelated injuries not reversible error).
58413 S.W.2d 910 (1967).
" American Sur. Co. v. Semmons, 413 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
"' Gill v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 417 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
" Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Gallegos, 415 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
" Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Potter, 411 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref.
n.r.e.
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Verdict of the Jury. Findings that a claimant had suffered a total disability which commenced on May 14, 1965, and other findings that he had
suffered partial disability on May 14, 1965, were held to be in fatal and
irreconcilable conflict, as a person cannot be totally and partially incapacitated at the same time. 3 Moreover, the finding that the average weekly
wage-earning capacity of a claimant during the existence of his partial incapacity was "none" was conflicting within itself as a person who has no
wage-earning capacity is totally and not partially incapacitated.
VI.

BENEFITS AND BENEFICIARIES

Operation. In Royal Indemnity Co. v. Dennis4 the Texas Supreme Court
followed the statutory provision,"5 holding that where surgery to relieve
hernia was unsuccessful but the employee sustained total disability for only
six weeks, he was entitled to compensation for only six weeks of total disability. This was so even though under the statute the employee would
have been entitled to compensation for twenty-six weeks had the operation been successful, since the statute expressly provides that if an operation is not successful an employee shall be paid compensation under the
general provisions, the same as if the operation had not been undertaken.
The federal court likewise applied the statutory provision in a case
where the Board ordered, but the employee refused to submit to, an operation for a back injury. The court held that the provision of the Act in reference to such an operation adopted the liabilities which are provided in
the case of a hernia, so that the employee was limited to fifty-two weeks
compensation."
In another case, where the Industrial Accident Board ordered an operation for a hernia in the absence of one member of the Board, the order
was void and claimant was entitled to total and permanent incapacity in
view of the jury finding to that effect."6
Medical Expenses. Where claimant was entitled to workmen's compensation benefits, civil appeals decisions indicated that he was also entitled to
medical expenses,6" even though he did not originally make an express demand that the insurance carrier furnish the additional medical services."
The court in one case" stated that the intent behind the provisions of section 7 of article 8 3 06" requires that the carrier be responsible for furnishing all reasonable and necessary medical care for any compensable injury,
"aTravelers Ins. Co. v. Amason, 413 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). An excellent discussion will be found in Comment, A Special Issue Quandary-Submitting "Partial Incapacity"
in Workmen's Compensation, 21 Sw. L.J. 513 (1967).
64410 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. 1966).
65
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12b (1967).
6
6Id. § 12e.
"'Duncan v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 371 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1967).
"SWolff v. Travelers Ins. Co., 410 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r'.e.
6"Maryland Cas. Co. v. Spritzman, 410 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
76Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Steadman, 415 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error
ref. n.r.e.; Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Farley, 408 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
"Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Farley, 408 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
2
" Tnx. REv. Clv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 7 (1967).
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whether or not a previous express demand has been made by claimant, as
long as a proper notice of injury has been given.

In Pearce v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n 7" the Texas Supreme
Court dealt with a case of first impression involving a compromise settlement. Claimant and insurer entered into a settlement agreement encompassing future medical aid, hospital services, nursing, and medicines. Thereafter, claimant had a recurrence of the physical disability and filed another
claim for compensation. The supreme court agreed with the lower court's
decision that the prior compromise settlement precluded another claim.
The compromise settlement was held not to be ineffective to prevent a
future claim as being in contravention of section 5 of article 8307." That
statute only prevents an award or judgment for future medical expenses from being res judicata to a second claim; there is no similar statutory prohibition regarding a compromise settlement.
Subrogation Suit. In a court of civil appeals case," the workmen's compensation insurer, who had paid $1,711.85 to the injured claimant, sought
to enforce its subrogation rights against a third party. The third party
denied liability to the insurer on the ground that he had already paid the
employee $1,000 in settlement, and had obtained a release from the employee. The trial court entered judgment for the third party based on the
release and because of the jury finding that the employee had been contributorily negligent in causing the accident. In reversing, the court of
civil appeals restated the rule of Pan American Insurance Co. v. Hi-Plains

Haulers"' that:
[T]he third party's negligence need not be judicially established before the
compensation carrier is entitled to assert its claim for subrogation and, where
the employee and the third party entered into a settlement, both employee
and the third party were liable to the carrier for the amount so paid, up to
the amount of compensation paid by the carrier to the employee."
In another case, the release of a third party by the employee before a
compensation payment had been made or assumed was held to destroy the
insurer's right of subrogation against the third party and was a bar to
compensation proceedings by the employee against the insurer, even though
the release purported not to affect such compensation." In a similar case,
a claimant, by proceeding to claim and collect benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, was precluded on the grounds of election, estoppel, and res judicata from thereafter maintaining a common law action for
73412 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. 1967).
"

4

TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.

art. 8307,

5S

(1967).

3
" Home Indem. Co. v. Thompson, 407 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
76Pan American Ins. Co. v. Hi-Plains Haulers, 163 Tex. 1, 350 S.W.2d 644 (1961). See
generally, Note, Settlement of Third Party Liability in Workman's Compensation, 21 Sw. L.J.

692

(1967).
71 163 Tex. at

5, 350 S.W.2d at 646.
7' Warneke v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 407 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r'.e.;
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (1967).
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damages, either actual or exemplary, against a fellow employee for injuries
resulting from an intentional blow struck by the fellow employee."
In a Fifth Circuit case" ° the beneficiaries of four deceased employees
claimed and collected workmen's compensation benefits under the laws of
Oklahoma for the death of the employees. The accident occurred when the
employees were returning from Texas, where their employer had some
work, to Oklahoma, where their employer's main operations were. Since
the laws of Oklahoma do not provide for any right of subrogation in
connection with a death action, the insurer who covered the employer's
operations in both Texas and Oklahoma could not assert a right of subrogation under the Texas law against the third party.
Maturity Suit. In a suit under the statute"' for the full amount of the
matured award, twelve per cent penalty, and reasonable attorney's fees,
the court of civil appeals affirmed the judgment for claimant. The court
held that "claims drafts" did not constitute sufficient "payment" to preclude a maturity suit and that mailing weekly installments to the post
office for delivery to "Addressee only" did not constitute a proper tender."
Claimant's attorney wrote insurer a letter on June 9, 1967, objecting to the
medium of payment. The letter was received on Friday, June 11, and on
Monday, June 14, the maturity suit was filed. The court held that insurer
waived any claim of justifiable cause for late payment by failing to request
any such findings in the trial court.
In another case, both the claimant and the insurer had given notice of
appeal from the award of the Industrial Accident Board but neither had
filed suit in time to perfect an appeal." Claimant filed suit for the accrued
compensation benefits, medical expenses, twelve per cent penalty, and attorney's fees. The court held that the insurer's appeal from an adverse
judgment in the claimant's maturity suit could not attack the Board's original award of medical payments to the claimant on the ground of vagueness. Such an attempt would be a collateral attack on the Board's award;
the award was a final order within the meaning of the statute and timely
appeal from that award had not been made.
Death Beneficiaries. In Turner v. Travelers Insurance Co.'" the Texas
Supreme Court held that a dependent child of a deceased employee was
entitled to death benefits to the exclusion of the mother of the employee.
In a second case, children who had been adopted by third parties were held
to be entitled to death benefits for the death of their natural father to the
exclusion of the parents of the deceased employee.8'
"'Heibel v. Bermann, 407 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN.
art. 8306, § 3 (1967).
"Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Panhandle & S.F.R.R., 367 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1966).
"TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5a (1967).
"'Home Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 409 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
"General
Accident, Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Hames, 416 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Civ. App.
1967).
84406 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. 1966).
'"Patton v. Shamburger, 413 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error granted.
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VII. CONCLUSION

It has been said that "hard facts make bad law," but as illustrated above,
they also make good law. In the workmen's compensation field, slightly
different facts and unprecedented situations make lots of law, and, so far,
the volume of workmen's compensation cases in the appellate courts of
Texas is keeping pace with the population explosion, with new angles arising every year.

